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Latin American 
commodity exports 
The case of 
cotton fibre 
Alberto Orlandi* 
One of the economic activities that has been most 
seriously affected by the current crisis of the Latin 
American economy is the production and exportation 
of commodities. 
In the case of cotton, a product which is of such 
vital importance to some countries of the region, this 
difficulty has been further aggravated by a structural 
crisis whose signs had already been evident in recent 
decades, particularly as a result of the strong competi-
tion of synthetic fibres. 
In this article, a brief analysis is made of trends in 
the production, trade and consumption of cotton fibre 
in the world; this is followed by a review of the factors 
that have influenced this competition, stressing its im-
plications for Latin America. Later on, a description of 
the general features of the cotton industry in the re-
gion serves as an introduction to a more detailed study 
of five country cases: Argentina, Paraguay, Mexico, 
Guatemala and Nicaragua. 
Although the five cases are very different in many 
respects (as regards the importance of cotton in the 
national economy, the economic agents that are pre-
sent in cotton production and trading, public policies, 
etc.), they nevertheles have one thing in common: 
there has been a process of erosion of the profitability 
of the cotton industry which has accelerated in recent 
years and has raised serious doubts regarding the fu-
ture viability of this crop. 
The author then discusses the attempts that have 
been made, so far not very succesfully, to achieve 
international co-ordination in the area of cotton, and, 
in conclusion, evaluates briefly the different ways in 
which the cotton-growing countries of Latin America 
have responded to the current crisis. 
*Staff member of the International Trade and 
Development Division of KCLA. 
This article is a summarized version of a broader study 
(América Latina y la economía mundial del algodón) to be 
published soon. 
Introduction 
One of the fundamental concepts of Latin Amer-
ican structuralist economics, in its most genuine 
and original expression,1 has been that one of 
the main obstacles to development is the chronic 
deterioration of the terms of trade of commodi-
ty-exporting countries, as the relative prices of 
their commodities have fallen constantly vis-à-vis 
the prices of imported manufactured goods. 
What made it difficult to overcome this situa-
tion within the existing scheme of world econom-
ic organization was basically a difference in the 
income-elasticities of demand, which appear to 
be lower with respect to commodities than with 
respect to industrial goods. 
This was one of the most important reasons 
for the creation of UNCTAD in the mid-1960s. 
Thus, strategies regarding commodities and, 
above all, concerning commodity price stabiliza-
tion agreements became the axis of international 
co-operation for development. 
This approach was criticized from several 
angles. Some considered it reductionist, in that 
many Latin American countries were going into 
economic spheres that transcended the mere ex-
traction and exportation of raw materials; others 
felt that it had been overtaken by events, in view 
of the oil crisis which led to an increase in the 
relative prices of some commodities. 
In practice, although there is no question 
that the share of commodities in overall Latin 
American exports has declined, they are still very 
important, accounting for over 40% in the re-
gion as a whole and over 70% when the oil-
exporting countries are excluded. 
Moreover, the arguments which explain 
—beyond sharp short-term fluctuations— the 
chronic deterioration of relative prices are fun-
damentally valid for most commodities other 
than oil, which is a very special case. 
Thus, in times of crisis such as the present, 
commodity prices tend to fall more than would 
"In this regard, see R. Prebisch, The Economic Develop-
ment of Latin America and its Principal Problems, United Nations, 
New York, 1949; ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America, San-
tiago, 1949; R. Prebisch, Nueva política comercial para el des-
arroUo, Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1964; and 
R. ?rebisch,Haciaunaestrategiaglobalparaeldesarrollo, United 
Nations, New York, 1968. These documents are reproduced 
in a recent publication entitled La obra de Prebisch en la CEPAL 
(Selección de A. Gurrieri), Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 1982. 
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seemjustified in light of the level of world econom-
icactivity, at least as long as there are no direct 
mechanisms for protecting them. 
The economic resources of much of the 
population of many Latin American countries 
and a decisive proportion of their capacity for 
procuring foreign exchange depend on com-
modities; therefore, it is often impossible to 
establish measures to restrict supply so as to ad-
just it to depressive periods (in Guatemala, these 
proportions are 20% for both cotton and coffee; 
in Nicaragua, 25% for cotton and 20% for cof-
fee). This is particularly true in the case of agri-
More than 65 million bales (a bale weighs 480 
pounds) of cotton were produced throughout 
the world in 1980. This is more than twice the 
amount produced in 1950 and almost 50% more 
than the production for 1961. This means that, 
despite the considerable competition of synthetic 
fibres, cotton production has grown steadily 
throughout the postwar period. 
At the same time, however, the relative share 
of the various regions of the world has changed. 
The United States, which accounted for around 
one-third of total world production up to the 
1960s, has seen its share drop sharply to its pres-
ent level of 18%. For the drop in the United 
States' share there has been a corresponding in-
crease, in percentage terms, by the centrally 
planned economies, particularly China and the 
Soviet Union, whose shares of total world pro-
duction now amount to 19% and 22%. 
The developing countries, for their part, 
have expanded their output of cotton at the same 
rate that world production has increased, thus 
maintaining a 40% to 45% share throughout the 
postward period. The same may be said of Latin 
America, whose share in total world production 
has not changed significantly over the last two 
decades (a trend which was also maintained by 
Brazil, the main producer of the region). Mex-
ico's share, however, has fallen steadily. 
cultural and mining goods, which have a mini-
mum production period of several years, but it is 
also true in the case of annual crops such as 
cotton, inasmuch as it would be very difficult to 
replace them by other crops, at least over the 
short term. 
This article presents a description and a crit-
ical evaluation of the cotton industry in Latin 
America, particularly from the standpoint of its 
role in exports. Emphasis is placed on those ele-
ments serving to throw light on the current situa-
tion, which may be defined as one of crisis, both 
conjuctural and structural. 
Between 1960 and 1980, the area sown with 
cotton remained constant at a worldwide level of 
around 32 million hectares. However, its dis-
tribution among the different areas of the world 
changed in approximately the same way as 
trends in production. Consequently, increases in 
production have been due to substantial in-
creases in yields, which in turn are the result of 
technological innovations relating to the de-
velopment of new varieties, pest control, mecha-
nized harvesting and the use of fertilizers. 
Without taking sides in the controversy 
which has arisen regarding the ecological dam-
age caused by the excessive use of pesticides and 
fertilizers and the heavy impact of production 
costs, which absorb much of the increase in 
yields, it should be noted that yields have indeed 
increased remarkably both at the worldwide level 
(from 316 to 433 kg per hectare between 1960 
and 1980) and also in Latin America (from 300 to 
409 kg/ha). Some countries, such as Mexico, El 
Salvador and Guatemala, had some of the high-
est yields in the world in 1980. This was particu-
larly true of Guatemala, which with 1 238 kg/ha 
ranked second in the world, after Israel and be-
fore Australia and Egypt. 
As regards consumption of cotton fibre over 
the last few decades, there has been a definite 
I 
Cotton fibre in the world 
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increase, in both absolute and relative terms and 
in both developing and centrally-planned-
economy countries. At the beginning of the 
1980s, these two areas already accounted for 
80% of world consumption (compared with 60% 
in 1960) while the industrialized countries' share 
dropped to half during the same period, i.e., 
from 40% to 20% approximately. In this regard, 
it is interesting to note that, despite the fact that 
most of the trade in cotton takes place outside the 
Between 1955 and 1978, world consumption of 
textile fibres as a whole grew by 3.9% per year on 
average, while the population grew by 1.9%. 
Offhand, this would seem to indicate that, even 
on a per capita basis, the increase in consumption 
was dramatic. 
A breakdown of these figures, however, will 
show that the increase in consumption of cotton 
fibre (2.1%) was very similar to the population 
growth rate, while that of cellulosic artificial 
fibres was only slightly higher (2.3%); on the 
other hand, the share of synthetic fibres rose 
from 5% in 1960 to 35% in 1979.2 The average 
annual increase in consumption of synthetic 
fibres fell from its extraordinarily high level of 
21% between 1960 and 1970 to 9.5% for the 
period 1970-1978, but although cotton con-
sumption rose significantly in absolute terms, its 
share of total fibre consumption fell from 68% in 
1960 to 48% in 1979. 
As might be expected, the fundamental 
reason for this persistently downward trend may 
be explained by the evolution of the relationship 
between prices of natural and synthetic fibres, 
2See table 8. Textile fibres may be natural or artificial. 
The natural ones are plant fibres (cotton, jute, kenaf, sisal, 
hemp, henequén, etc.), animal fibres (wool, silk) and mineral 
fibres (asbestos). Artificial fibres are classified as cellulosic 
(rayon and acetate) an non-cellulosk; the tatter include organ-
ic fibres (nylon, polyester, polyvinyl, and polyurethane) and 
inorganic fibres (glass or metal). 
markets of the industrialized countries, they are 
the ones who set the prices. 
It is no less important, also, to note the evolu-
tion of apparent consumption of cotton in the 
Chinese People's Republic, which, from a level 
lower than that of Europe or the United States in 
1961, has now reached the point where it is 
equivalent to around one-fourth of the world 
total and is thus higher than that of the indus-
trialized countries as a whole (see table 1). 
which has been particularly favourable to syn-
thetics, especially since the 1970s. Table 2 shows, 
however, how the combined effect of the 
increase in oil prices and the drop in cotton 
prices has caused the situation to change again, 
from 1977 onwards, at least in the United States 
domestic market. 
It is expected that in future, although this 
price ratio will continue to be a fundamental 
variable that must be taken into account, it will be 
more stable than it has been in the past and that 
the erosion of the competitiveness of cotton vis-à-
vis synthetic fibres will be checked. 
Even so, taking into account both structural 
factors (population growth rates, evolution of 
world demand for textiles, etc.) and elements of a 
more sectoral nature (increased synthetic fibre 
production capacity in the centrally planned and 
developing countries, evolution of relative 
prices, consumer preferences), the available pro-
jections all indicate that the share of cotton in 
world fibre consumption will still fall, albeit more 
gradually from its current level (48%) to 42%-
45% in 1990.3 
3For projections of world cotton consumption, see 
World Bank, Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities, 
Washington, January 1980; and US Department of 
Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, World Cotton 
Production and Use: Projections for 1985 and 1990, Washington, 
June 1979. See also World Bank, international Cotton Market 
Prospects, Staff Commodity Paper No. 2, Washington, June 
1978. 
II 
Cotton and synthetic fibres 
Table 1 
PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION, EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF COTTON FIBRE BY MAJOR COUNTRIES AND REGIONS 





























































































































































































Source: International Cotton Advisory Committee. 
a
 Estimates. 
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Table 2 
EVOLUTION OF THE RATIO BETWEEN COTTON FIBRE PRICES AND 




















































Sources: US Department of Agriculture, Cotton and wool: outlook and situation. 
a
 Strict Middling 1-1/16" at mill in United States. 
b




The international cotton fibre trade 
The proportion of world cotton production that 
enters the circuits of international trade has fall-
en over the las two decades. Between 1961 and 
1980, it fell from 59% to approximately 30%; of 
particular importance in this regard is the fact 
that countries such as Brazil and Peru and in 
particular China have assigned a growing pro-
portion of their production ( 100% in the cases of 
Brazil and China) to the domestic market. 
Since the absolute quantities of cotton ex-
ported throughout the world have grown at very 
slow rates (see table 1), most of the growth of 
textile demand has been in the trade of yarns and 
made-up articles. Suffice it to say that, in terms of 
value, the latter category represented less than 
half of the total trade in fibre in 1961, whereas 
the opposite is now true: trade in made-up arti-
cles is more than double the world trade in fibres. 
The export of textiles and made-up articles is 
one of the areas in which the success of the re-
cently industrialized countries is most evident. 
This explains why, in 1980, the volume of cotton 
fibre imported by Hong Kong and Korea alone 
was equivalent to half that of all Western Europe. 
As regards Latin America, its share in world 
cotton fibre exports, after having risen to 25%-
30% in the late 1960s, fell both in absolute and in 
relative terms to the current level of three million 
bales, which is equivalent to only 15% of total 
world exports. 
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IV 
Trends in prices 
The price series presented herein were taken 
from the magazine Cotton Outlook, published in 
Liverpool. These figures, which are recognized 
throughout the world and accepted as reliable, 
refer to a grade with a high unit value (extra-long 
Egyptian cotton), one of medium value (Mexican 
cotton) and, Finally, one with a rather low unit 
value (United States cotton) (see table 3). 
The price series have been deflated by the 
CIF price index of exports of manufactures from 
the developed countries. These series make it 
possible to appreciate the problems created by 
the heavy fluctuations that have occured in cur-
rent and constant values. 
The organization of cotton production and 
marketing varies greatly from one area of the 
world to another, depending on how land own-
ership, production, credit, and domestic and ex-
ternal marketing systems are organized. 
It appears that the increasing cost of inputs4 
has brought about a concentration in the struc-
ture of ownership of cotton land at the world 
level. This is true of both the United States and 
most of the developing countries. In Latin Amer-
ica, over the last 20 years, the trend has been 
towards an increase in the average size of cotton 
production units, particularly in Mexico and 
Central America, where the decrease in the prof-
itability of marginal land has apparently led to 
the expulsion of a large number of cotton grow-
4In this regard, see International Cotton Advisory Com-
mittee, Survey of Costs of Production of Raw Cotton, Washington, 
October 1981. 
At the same time, a long-term trend towards 
lower prices is to be observed. This was accentu-
ated in 1981-1982 and has given rise to doubts 
about the prospects of cotton as an export crop 
capable of generating an appreciable amount of 
foreign exchange, especially in the Latin Amer-
ican countries. 
Because there is a close relationship between 
export and domestic prices and because, in 
general, there are no price guarantee mecha-
nisms, the erratic behaviour and the chronically 
low level of cotton prices have seriously reduced 
income from cotton production, to the extent 
that in many cases, when this has been possible, it 
has been replaced by other crops. 
ers. In addition, these changes may also be due in 
part to the availability of alternative food or non-
food crops.5 
In addition to the changes that have taken 
place over time, there are still traditional differ-
ences in the average size of cotton production 
units in the different countries. In Central 
America, this indicator ranges from a minimum 
of 24.5 ha in Costa Rica (1980) to a maximum of 
439 ha in Guatemala (also 1980).6 These aver-
ages may, of course, conceal very different situa-
tions at the two extremes of the statistical sample. 
Thus, for example, although in 1978 the average 
size of a cotton farm in El Salvador was just over 
5In this regard, see ICAC, Survey of Crops Competing with 
Cotton, Washington, November 1979. 
6See Permanent Secretariat of the General Treaty on 
Central American Economic Integration, Situación actual y 
perspectivas del algodón y la semilla de algodón, Guatemala, 1980. 
V 
General characteristics of the cotton 
industry in Latin America 



































EVOLUTION OF COTTON PRICES 
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Source: World Bank, Commodity Trade and Price Trends, Washington, 1981. 
a
 CIF Liverpool. For the period 1950-1956, prices are for middling 15/16" cotton; afterwards, for 1" middling cotton. 
b
 CIF Liverpool. For the period 1951-1962, prices are for Karnak fully good; after 1963, Menouh fully good. 
r
 St. middling 1-1/16" CIF Northern Europe. Before 1974, CIF Liverpool; 1955-1959, St. middling 1-1/2". 
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30 hectares, 27 farms (out of a total of 3 275) 
controlled one-fourth of all production, while in 
Guatemala, in 1979, 40 producers controlled 
slightly less than half the cultivated area. 
As regards forms of ownership, private own-
ership is predominant in Latin America, with the 
notable exceptions of Nicaragua (where 15% of 
cotton land is nationalized), Mexico (where 50% 
consists of ejidos) and Peru (which has a strong 
co-operative sector). 
Credit systems also vary very considerably, 
ranging from the cases of Brazil and Mexico 
(where more than 50% of production is financed 
with public credit) to the other extreme, in 
Guatemala (where slightly over 10% of produc-
tion costs are financed by national, public and 
private banks). 
Domestic marketing, another fundamental 
aspect of the cotton industry, has also followed 
very different patterns throughout the world 
and in Latin America. 
In some countries of the region, the cotton 
market is regulated basically by the free play of 
supply and demand, as is the case in Guatemala 
and Paraguay. At the other extreme is Nicara-
gua, where cotton marketing has become a State 
monopoly. In between these cases are countries 
such as Peru and Ecuador, where price-support 
mechanisms are applied; or others, where 
co-operative marketing structures play an 
important role (Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador 
and Mexico), while finally there are countries 
where the State undertakes to purchase part of 
the crop (Peru and Mexico). 
Another fundamental difference lies in the 
systems used in the different countries for gin-
ning operations.7 There has been a trend towards 
concentration of ginning plants, and this has cre-
ated idle capacity, especially in countries with a 
long-standing cotton-growing tradition. 
'Ginning is the mechanical separation of fibre from the 
seeds. The cotton fibre is made into bales ready for export, 
while the seed is used in the preparation of edible oils. 
In addition, whereas in some cases ginning 
operations involve public capital (Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Peru) or co-operatives (Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, El Salvador), in others (Guate-
mala and Paraguay) this process is a private-
enterprise activity linked either backwards (to 
the sectors of production) or forwards (to the 
marketing sectors). 
Finally, the differences with respect to the 
systems used for external marketing are also sig-
nificant. Exporting enterprises of foreign origin 
(some of the most active in Latin America are 
Volkart, Esteve, Cargill, Continental, McFad-
den, Itoh and Bunge and Born) seem to be less 
important now at the global level, but they are 
still predominant in countries such as Paraguay 
and Mexico, or they at least maintain a strong 
presence, as in Argentina and Guatemala. In 
other situations, external marketing structures 
linked either to national private enterprise (Gua-
temala, Mexico), to national cotton co-operatives 
(Argentina, El Salvador) or the public sector (Pe-
ru, Mexico and Nicaragua) play a role whose 
importance varies from case to case. 
In addition to playing a role as an exporting 
agent per se, the public sector indirectly influ-
ences cotton exports by establishing the legal 
framework within which these activities are car-
ried out. 
Thus, for example, Brazil so encouraged the 
export of yarns and made-up articles that it prac-
tically disappeared from the international cotton 
fibre market. Other countries have either re-
fused to subsidize cotton fibre or in some cases 
have even imposed export taxes on it (see table 
4). 
Finally, all producer countries apply legal 
measures to protect local industry from imports 
of fibre. The few exceptions to this rule refer to 
special grades (extra-long staple for the textile 
industry in Argentina, Brazil or Mexico) or spe-
cial situations (e.g., the quota of 20 000 tons 
granted by Argentina to Paraguay). 
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Table 4 
SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION APPLICABLE TO THE EXPORT OF 
COTTON IN LATIN AMERICA 












0.075 quetzal/lb (1982) 
Mex. $ 14/kg (1982) 
None 
Between 4 and 5% (1982) 
ad valorem 









Freedom to dispose of 
50% of foreign exchange 
earnings 
None 
Source: ICAC, USDA and field surveys. 
a
 Legislation specifies in what currency the tax is to be paid and the year of application. In the case of 
variable taxes, the applicable level is based on a price of US$ 0.70/lb. 
VI 
Individual country cases 
1. Argentina 
We shall begin our analysis of specific situations 
of fibre-exporting countries8 with Argentina, be-
cause it is a country in which cotton exports play a 
basically subsidiary role, inasmuch as domestic 
production is mainly directed at supplying the 
domestic market. 
With total production estimated at 620 000 
bales for the 1981/1982 season, Argentina ranks 
third among the cotton-producing countries of 
Latin America. Thus, it has managed to halt the 
gradual deterioration which had been taking 
place in its cotton production. 
Both the volume of production and the 
volume of exports have fluctuated greatly, 
according to the ups and downs of the national 
textile industry, Of international prices and, fun-
8Brazil and Colombia have deliberately been excluded, 
as they mainly export textiles and made-up articles. The 
study of their cases would require a very different approach 
which would go beyond the scope of this article. 
damentally, of the exchange situation. Exports, 
for example, have ranged from zero, or near 
zero, up to a maximum of over half a million 
bales during the 1979/1980 crop season (see table 
5). 
Although cotton plays a relatively minor role 
in Argentine agriculture as a whole, this is not the 
case in the provinces of Santa Fe and, in particu-
lar, El Chaco, where 23% and 58% respectively 
of national production are concentrated. In El 
Chaco, during the period 1974-1979, cotton rep-
resented between 45% and 65% of the agricul-
tural GDP and between 10% and 15% of the total 
GDP. 
Ownership of cotton farms is very scattered 
in Argentina and this has held back the mod-
ernization of the sector. According to figures 
referring only to the province of El Chaco, 70% 
of the cotton farmers had holdings of less than 20 
hectares and 93% had less than 50 hectares in 
1974. It is considered that a modern production 
unit should be at least 50 hectares in size. 
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Table 5 
ARGENTINA: BASIC STATISTICS ON AREA SOWN, PRODUCTION, YIELD, DOMESTIC 
CONSUMPTION, EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF COTTON FIBRE, 
1950/1951 T O 1980/1981 
Yeara 
Area sown Production Consumption Exports Imports 
(thousands (thousands (thousands (thousands (thousands 
















































































Source: National Rural Economics and Sociology Service of the Ministry of Agriculture; International Cotton 
Advisory Committee. 
a
 Cotton-growing years, from 1 August to 31 July. 
The predominance of small farms has led to 
the presence of intermediaries {acopladores) be-
tween producers and gin operators, except in 
those cases where geographical proximity or a 
particular spirit of initiative on the part of either 
the producer or the processor made it possible to 
avoid this. 
Thus, between 50% and 55% of production 
is channelled through acopiadores, while the rest 
is distributed between producer co-operatives9 
(between 30% and 40%) and direct sales (the 
remaining 5% to 10%). 
The aforementioned share of co-operatives 
in marketing is the result of a similar level of 
participation in ginning operations. The remain-
der is carried out by commercial companies 
which purchase raw cotton either from interme-
diaries or directly from farmers. 
The cotton sector of Argentina is now going 
through a serious crisis, largely because of the 
convergence of three highly negative factors: 
a) the international situation, which has caused 
cotton prices to fall; b) the heavy overvaluation 
of the Argentine currency from 1977 to 1981, 
which depressed the prices received at that time 
by farmers, and c) the extremely high level of 
bank interest rates during those same years. As a 
result of this situation, which is similar to that 
affecting other peripheral crops in the country, 
the cumulative debt backlog of the cotton sector 
of El Chaco in February 1982 was equivalent, 
according to official estimates, to the value of two 
complete harvests.10 
The gradual devaluation of the Argentine 
peso which took place from 1981 onwards, as 
well as several other measures specifically 
directed at the cotton sector (special reimburse-
ment arrangements for exports at a rate 7% 
higher than the official exchange rate ' ' and the 
9Most of these co-operatives were created during the 
1930s and 1940s. They are currently going through a very 
critical stage, particularly because they are heavily indebted. 
The co-operatives only take part in marketing and ginning 
operations, with agricultural production as such remaining in 
private hands. 
l0See Ministerio de Economía de la Provincia del Chaco, 
Análisis de la situación: Sector primario, Resistencia, March 
1982. 
"Th i s measure replaced a previous one which had the 
opposite effect and which, along with other minor taxes, 
represented a levy of approximately 7.5% on cotton exports. 
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allocation ofa special fund of 270 billion pesos to 
cover payments made to cotton farmers accord-
ing to the area sown), undoubtedly helped allevi-
ate the producers' situation. Nevertheless, 
according to official estimates, even with a gov-
ernment contribution of 900 000 pesos per hec-
tare, receipts for the crop would only cover direct 
operating costs. As may be seen in table 6, even 
with yields of 1 300 kg per hectare of raw cotton 
—i.e., 430 kg/ha of Fibre— the crop would bring 
losses if total production costs were considered; 
thus, far from being alleviated, the indebtedness 
situation has probably got worse.12 
Let us now look beyond the current difficul-
ties, however, and turn our attention to external 
marketing activities.. 
As has been mentioned above, the total 
volume of cotton exports has fluctuated sharply 
from one year to another, though always main-
taining a secondary position with respect to pro-
duction for the national textile industry. In any 
event appreciable quantities have been freed for 
export, and this activity brought in annual for-
12Of particular importance is the impact of labour costs, 
which may amount to 40% of total costs. In addition, little 
progress has been made in the process of mechanization, 
among other things because of the small average size of 
holdings. It is important, however, to bear in mind that this 
was the situation in mid-1982; the effect of any measures that 
may have been taken after that date is not yet known. 
eign exchange income of over US$ 100 million 
on average for the years 1977-1980. 
When the costs of ginning, freight, insurance 
and financial and other charges are deducted, 
and the exchange rate of the moment is taken 
into account, international prices also determine 
domestic prices. 
Shipments are concentrated in the post-
harvest months, i.e., between April and August, 
and are generally made by traders representing 
the large multinational companies (Bunge and 
Born, Cargill, Esteve, Cotton Roster) which have 
offices in Buenos Aires. 
So far, efforts to use other channels for ex-
ports have not succeeded; among other alterna-
tives, consideration has been given to the possi-
bility of sending Argentine fibre to the Asian 
countries via the Chilean port of Antofagasta.13 
Asia —particularly China, Taiwan, Japan and 
Hong Kong— currently receives more than 70% 
of Argentine cotton fibre exports, whereas in the 
late 1960s its share was not as high as that of the 
European countries. 
In brief, the situation in Argentina is as fol-
lows: i) cotton exports play a secondary role with 
respect to domestic consumption; ii) the sector is 
going through a serious crisis, which gives rise to 
13There is a currently very under-utilized railway to this 
port. 
Table 6 
ARGENTINA: ESTIMATED PROFITABILITY PER HECTARE OF COTTON FOR 
SEASON 1981/1982, FOR DIFFERENT YIELD LEVELS 




Current price plus fiscal contribution 
Current price less total costs 
Current price less operating costs 
Current price less total costs, plus 
fiscal contribution 
Current price less operating costs, 
plus fiscal contribution 
1 000 kg/ha 
5 819 553 
3 296 814 
2 977 500 
3 877 500 
—2 842 053 
— 319314 
—1 942 053 
580 686 
Yield (raw cotton) 
1 200 kg/ha 
5 062 252 
2 952 351 
3 573 000 
4 473 000 
—2 246 553 
276 186 
—1 346 553 
1 176 186 
1 300 kg/ha 
4 770 953 
2 819 866 
3 870 350 
4 770 350 
—1 948 803 
573 936 
—1 048 803 
1 473 936 
Source: Ministry of the Economy, El Chaco Province. 
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doubts about the viability of the crop over 
the medium and long terms, and Hi) this situ-
ation, which is common to the country's other 
peripheral crops as well, can only be solved if the 
public sector, considering the enormous social 
significance of the crop in the provinces con-
cerned, intensifies support measures. 
2. Paraguay 
The cotton situation in Paraguay is very different 
from that of Argentina. In Paraguay, cotton pro-
duction grew very rapidly during the 1970s and 
this commodity became the country's major ex-
port, with a share of between 30% and 40%, i.e., 
the highest proportion of any Latin American 
country and one of the highest in the world. 
As is shown in table 7, this increase was part-
ly due to technical causes (the introduction of 
high-yield varieties, the use of modern inputs, 
etc.) and partly to what may be called social 
causes (increased ginning capacity, with the re-
sulting breakdown of the former ginning "car-
tel"; increased monetarization of the rural econ-
omy, with the resulting increase in the value of 
cotton as a cash crop; introduction of new eco-
nomic agents, especially new immigrants). 
Table 7 
PARAGUAY: BASIC STATISTICS ON AREA SOWN, PRODUCTION, YIELD, DOMESTIC 




















































































Source: Ministry of Agriculture. 
In terms of area sown, cotton is the most 
important crop of the country and has alternated 
in first place with maize. In geographical terms, 
the distribution of cotton production through-
out the various regions is almost entirely in line 
with the density of the rural population. In terms 
of land tenure, it is estimated that there are 
around 80 000 cotton holdings in the country, 
with an average area of approximately four hec-
tares. 
Producers operate individually and sell their 
crops to intermediaries (acopiadores) or subinter-
mediaries (truck owners or local agents of 
medium-sized and large acopiadores). The acopia-
dores also often act as de facto representatives 
(although they do enjoy a certain degree of com-
mercial and financial autonomy) of domestic or 
foreign gin operators or exporters. 
As regards the internal organization of pro-
duction and marketing, free enterprise struc-
tures are predominant. The public sector and 
co-operatives play only a minor role. 
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Moreover, the acoplador plays a very impor-
tant role in Paraguayan cotton agriculture, often 
going beyond the strictly economic sphere. Pro-
ducers are very dependent on acopiadores, who 
provide financing arrangements (personal loans, 
occasional assistance) on a purely informal basis, 
and who are perceived by the farmers as being 
the personification, at the local level, of the polit-
ical authorities, regardless of whether or not the 
acopiador is formally invested with such authority 
by virtue of holding a post in the public adminis-
tration or in the dominant party. 
It is estimated that acopiadores obtain a net 
margin of between 5% and 15% of the FOB ex-
port price. This is an unusually high proportion 
compared with the rest of Latin America. 
As has been mentioned above, co-operative 
structures are very deficient in Paraguay. There 
is a National Co-operative Centre, which offers 
credit and ginning facilities, but it controls no 
more than 1% of national production. However, 
the Ministry of Agriculture has tried to promote 
the creation of Producer Committees which, 
although lacking legal status, are organized to 
carry out joint sales of cotton, purchasing of in-
puts, etc. Another notable exception is that of the 
co-operatives run by the Mennonite communi-
ties in the north of the country.14 
As regards the ginning stage, it is important 
to note that, contrary to what happens across the 
border in Argentina, this operation appears to be 
more closely linked to the final stages of the 
marketing process (i.e., sales to domestic indus-
try or for export) than to production or internal 
marketing. Given the low level of domestic con-
sumption (approximately 5% of total produc-
tion), there is a very close defacto link between gin 
operators and exporters which is not evident in 
other Latin American countries; in these cir-
cumstances gin operators/exporters account for 
10% to 20% of the FOB export price. 
l 4These communities are made up of followers of a 
Protestant religious group founded in Germany in the 
nineteenth century. Since 1930, when the first groups of 
Mennonites arrived in Paraguay, they have grown cotton 
together with other products (dairy products, livestock, 
vegetables and peanuts). These groups account for around 
2% of the total production of the country and are exceptional 
not only because of their co-operatives, but also because they 
strongly favour mechanization and 25% of their total harvest-
ing is mechanized. 
Almost all ginning-exporting enterprises are 
nationally owned, with the notable exceptions of 
CAPSA (Compañía Algodonera Paraguaya S.A.), 
which belongs to Compañía Transnacional Con-
tinental, and Algodonera Guaraní, which belongs to 
Esteve. These two firms control around one-
third of ginning operations and exports. Gin-
ning companies are also frequently involved in 
the oil industry, which uses cottonseed as its main 
raw material. 
It is also worth mentioning the tax burden 
which, through a series of complicated taxes,15 
accounts for between 4% and 5% of the FOB 
Asunción price. The effect of these taxes is lim-
ited by the fact that they are calculated on the 
basis of appraisals (valores de aforo) which have 
not been changed since 1976, and therefore, 
even with the current depressed prices, only rep-
resent around one-third of the FOB prices actual-
ly obtained. 
Moreover, to palliate the negative effect of 
these anachronistic export taxes, exporters are 
allowed, under certain conditions, to dispose 
freely of 50% of the foreign exchange they 
obtain.16 
Table 8 shows the different stages from pro-
duction to hypothetical delivery at the port of 
Liverpool. A careful look at these figures will 
show to what extent Paraguay suffers the direct 
economic consequences of its being a landlocked 
country. Freight costs from Asunción to Buenos 
Aires, plus related expenses (lines 4, 5 and 6) 
account for more than 10% of the final CIF price. 
If to that is added the cost of freight from Buenos 
Aires to Liverpool, the final share will amount to 
20%, which obviously increases the difference 
between the CIF Europe price and the FOB Asun-
ción price.17 
l 5These taxes vary according to the quality of the cotton 
exported. They consist of exchange taxes, customs duties, 
additional customs taxes, substitute income tax, official paper 
and stamps, port fees, fees for sanitary inspection and fees of 
the Cotton and Tobacco Control Bureau. Bank commissions 
and transport and dispatch costs, as well as dispatchers' com-
missions, must also be taken into account. The estimate of 
4-5% of FOB value refers to the total amount of all these taxes 
plus export expenses. 
16In April 1982, this was equivalent to a subsidy of 
around 15% of the FOB export price. 
17In the cases of the other countries, this share rarely 
amounts to 8%. 


























PARAGUAY: MAKEUP OF EXPORT COTTON PRICE, MARCH 1982 
CIF Liverpool price 
(Equivalent in US$/ton) 
Freight - Buenos Aires/Liverpool 
River freight - Asunción/Buenos Aires 
Transfer costs in Buenos Aires 
Other costs (insurance, interest, commission) 
FOB Asunción price 
(Equivalent in US$/ton) 
Exporter's income: 50% at 126 guaraníes 
Exporter's income: 50% at 160 guaraníes 
Total income 
Discount for taxes, fees and export costs 
Cost ex factory ( i+L-M) 
Costs and profits of ginning plant 
Cost of raw material at ginning plant 
(Equivalent per kg) 
Cost of raw cotton at ginning plant 
(deducting value of seed and estimating 
yield at 34%) 
Value of seed and linters (per kg of raw cotton) 
Actual cost of raw cotton at factory 
Tax, 1.5% 
Transport, storage, handling and other costs 
Discounts for humidity, quality, purity, etc. 


















































Source: Author's calculations based on data supplied by the Ministry of Industry and Trade. 
Note: It is important not to be misled by the conversion from dollars to guaraníes (lines 8 and 9) 
or from tons to kilogrammes (lines 15 and 16). 
Items 9 and 10 represent the two compo-
nents of the exporter's gross income (depending 
on whether or not he is free to dispose of foreign 
exchange received), which is reflected on line 11. 
The cost of fibre leaving the ginning plant (line 
13) is obtained by deducting taxes, fees and costs 
(line 12). 
Line 14 shows the gross margin obtained by 
the processor-exporter, which, as may be seen, 
accounts for more than 20% of the FOB Asunción 
price. A preliminary estímate shows half this fig-
ure to be attributable to fixed and variable costs 
and the other half to profits. The remainder 
represents the basic cost of the fibre (not count-
ing operating costs), which is reflected in lines 15 
and 16 and is converted to the cost of raw cotton 
(line 17) by applying a conversion rate (see table 
2) of 34%. 
This value, plus the selling price of seed and 
linters18 (line 18), gives the cost of raw cotton at 
the ginning plant. This is reflected on line 19. To 
obtain a fair market price for the product, it 
would still be necessary to deduct the ginning 
tax, transport, storage, classification and other 
costs, grade discounts and the approximate mar-
gin of the acoplador19 (items 20, 21, 22 and 23). 
The producer's price thus established (last line) 
amounts to 24.7% of the FOB export price, i.e., 
20% of the final CIF price at European ports. 
According to data compiled by the Central 
Bank of Paraguay,20 cotton exports from Para-
IBThesè products are residues of the ginning operation. 
l 9These figures do not take into account the possibility 
of further sub-intermediaries being involved. 
20Central Bank of Paraguay, Department of Economic 
Studies, Boletín Estadístico, monthly publication. 
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guay go to different destinations from those of 
other Latin American countries, inasmuch as the 
share of Asian countries is much lower (only 
10%), while sales to European countries are still 
large (over 75%). 
As in the rest of Latin America, the situation 
with respect to cotton in Paraguay is not free of 
problems. It is our impression, however, that 
even though cotton production began relatively 
late, it is strongly entrenched in the economic 
and social life of the country and that further 
modernization of agricultural and commercial 
practices must necessarily be accompanied by im-
provement of conditions on the international 
market if the crop is to be made fully profitable. 
3. Mexico 
With a production of 1 375 000 bales in 1981, 
Mexico was the second largest cotton producer 
of Latin America, next to Brazil, and ranked 
ninth worldwide. During that same year, it ex-
ported 675 000 bales, thus consolidating its posi-
tion as the largest exporter of the region. 
Cotton has been grown in Mexico since the 
pre-Columbian per iod. It was traditionally 
grown in the tropical areas, without irrigation, 
and then moved north (Sonora, Sinaloa, Baja 
California and La Laguna), as irrigation tech-
niques developed in the United States were in-
troduced. At present, 90% of Mexican cotton 
production is concentrated in the north of the 
country. 
Cotton-growing boomed during the period 
1953-1958, when 925 000 hectares were har-
vested and 435 000 tons of fibre were produced. 
Production then declined to the current level of 
375 000 hectares and between 320 000 and 
350 000 tons (see table 9). 
Parallel to this, the share of cotton in total 
exports fell from around 25% in 1955 to the 
present figure of less than 2%. 
In general terms, the role of cotton in the 
country's economy is similar in some ways to its 
role in Argentina. Production levels have tended 
to stagnate, the domestic textile industry is given 
priority over export activities, and the share of 
cotton in total exports is relatively low. Also as in 
Argentina, this apparent decline in the impor-
tance of cotton within the national economy con-
trasts with its great importance to the regional 
economies where it is concentrated, i.e., El Chaco 
Table 9 















































































Source: ECLA, Monografía del algodón en México (P.P.A/21/01), Mexico, 1978, and United States Department of 
Agriculture. 
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and Santa Fe, in Argentina, and the north and 
northwest, in Mexico. 
An analysis of the social structures of cotton 
production shows the fundamental significance, 
as in the rest of Mexican agriculture, of the ejido 
system, i.e., the unique way in which agricultural 
co-operativism has been practiced in this country 
since the agrarian revolution. 
While the ejido sector controls slightly less 
than half of both production and area sown, it 
receives most of the considerable resources 
(approximately 8 billion pesos) which the public 
sector, through the National Rural Credit Bank, 
has channelled to cotton producers. 
Financing terms are favourable (rates lower 
than market rates, with ample opportunity for 
contracting credit insurance) and it may there-
fore be said that the strategy for supporting the 
cotton sector has been carried out through credit 
.financing. In recent years, however, as policy has 
begun to be aimed at providing more massive 
suppoft for the food sector, cotton producers 
have been faced with a situation in which they are 
at a relative disadvantage compared with other 
producers. 
Also similar to the case of Argentina was the 
fact that the overvaluation of the national cur-
rency seriously eroded the profitability of cotton 
growing in 1981 and up to mid-1982, when de-
valuation took place.21 
Since in general there are no guaranteed or 
support prices for cotton, domestic prices follow 
the trend of international prices. The product is 
usually sold through co-operatives or, in the case 
of larger holdings, by the individual producers 
themselves. 
In very exceptional cases, the Federal Gov-
ernment intervenes, through ALGOCOMEX (Algo-
donera Comercial Mexicana, a public enterprise 
which normally operates on an equal footing 
with private firms), to protect producers, making 
massive purchases at prices higher than those 
prevailing on the market. This is what happened 
in 1974, when Mexico had a very large harvest 
(2 230 000 bales), which in turn was a result of 
the exceptionally high prices obtained during 
the previous season, when the government estab-
21At the beginning of 1982, for example, domestic pro-
duction costs were higher than international prices. 
lished an intervention price of 500 pesos per 100 
pounds (i.e., 40 US cents per pound), by virtue of 
which ALGOCOMEX purchased 45% of the crop, as 
compared with the usual 20% to 25%. 
Also as in the case of Argentina, ginning is in 
some respects a collateral activity usually associ-
ated with the phases of production (ginning 
plants are owned either by co-operatives or by 
individuals) or of marketing. 
In 1971, 21% of the installed ginning capac-
ity belonged to co-operatives, 8% to the public 
sector and the remaining 71 % was in the hands 
of large producers or commercial firms.22 This 
situation now seems to have changed in favour of 
co-operatives and the public sector. 
It should also be noted that there is a State 
ginning tax of between 1% and 4% which can be 
financed by the Federal Government. 
In Mexico there are a dozen large marketing 
firms which control around 80% of total cotton 
sales, for both the domestic and the export mar-
kets, and which also own a large part of the 
installed ginning capacity. Nine of these, repre-
senting almost 50% of total sales, are trans-
national (Esteve, Volkart , Hoenberg , Itoh, 
Allenberg, McFadden, Toyoshima and Ander-
son Clayton, in order of importance); two are 
private national firms (Longoria and Algodones 
del Pacifico) and one is public (ALGOCOMEX).23 
As might be expected, the transnational cor-
porations are much more involved in foreign 
sales (69% in 1980) than in domestic sales (31%), 
while the opposite is true of the private national 
firms (13% compared with 40%) and ALGOCOMEX 
(18% compared with 29%).24 
During the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, the local 
processing of raw materials in general, and of 
cotton in particular, became extremely impor-
tant because of the import-substitution process 
that was taking place in Mexico. Thus fibre con-
sumption increased, in both absolute and relative 
terms. During the 1960s, import substitution in 
the cotton textile industry practically stagnated, 
22See ECLA, Monografía del algodón en México (P.P.A/21/ 
01), Mexico City, 1978. 
23Along with ENAL of Nicaragua and ENCI of Peru.ALGO-
COMEX, is one of the few public cotton-marketing enterprises 
in Latin America. 
2,)See ECLA, The Mexican cotton industry and lhe transnation-
al cotton-marketing oligopoly, Santiago, Chile, 1982. 
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and this was the main reason for the loss of 
dynamism of domestic demand for cotton. 
A second and scarcely less important factor 
was the rapid growth of synthetic fibre produc-
tion in Mexico. It should be noted that both the 
availability of oil resources and the presence in 
Mexico of large petrochemical complexes, both 
domestic and foreign, undoubtedly accelerated 
this process. Thus, by 1979 consumption of 
synthethic fibre was higher than that of cotton, 
and indeed, the trend was more pronounced in 
Mexico than at the world level (see table 10). 
Table 10 
MEXICO: DEMAND FOR NATURAL 
AND SYNTHETIC FIBRES, 
1950-1979 

























Source: ECLA, The Mexican cotton industry..., op. cit. 
a
 Including imports. 
The share of synthethic fibres in total textile 
demand is much higher in Mexico than in any 
other developing country25 or even in the de-
veloped countries, where this indicator was be-
tween 30% and 40% at the end of the 1970s. The 
only consumption pattern similar to that of Mex-
ico appears to be that of the United States, where 
in the late 1970s the share of synthetic fibres in 
total textile consumption was very similar to that 
of Mexico, i.e., 50%.26 
25In 1979, this figure was 55% for Mexico, while for 
other countries it was as follows: Argentina, 19%; Venezuela, 
33%; Brazil, 32%; Egypt, 18%; Colombia, 22%, and Peru, 
29%. 
26In absolute figures, of course, per capita consumption 
of synthetic fibres was higher in the industrialized countries 
(between 4.5 and 9 kg per year in 1979, with the exception of 
the United States, where the indicator reached 15.4 kg) than 
in Mexico (3.4 kg). In the other developing countries, howev-
er, this figure was only around 0.8-1.4 kg per year, 
Returning to the Mexican cotton industry 
proper, we now only need to analyse the situation 
with respect to exports. 
In the first place, there is a flat-rate export 
tax of 1.28 peso per kg (or 2 US cents per pound) 
on fibre exported. 
Also, in special cases, such as during the 
price bonanza of the 1973/1974 season, the Gov-
ernment requires exporters to register and to 
obtain an export license before they are allowed 
to sell abroad. The purpose of this measure is to 
ensure an adequate domestic supply. 
As regards the destination of exports, sales 
are now highly concentrated in the Far East, 
which accounted for 80% in 1977 and 1978. In 
this regard, it is interesting to note that sales to 
Japan are nothing new for Mexico; the fact that 
Japanese trading firms set up offices in Mexico in 
the early postwar years has enhanced sales to that 
country. 
Finally, in addition to fibre, Mexico also ex-
ports cotton yarn and fabrics, which add about 
20% on top of the value of cotton fibre exports. 
The situation of the cotton industry in Mex-
ico may be summarized as follows: i) as in the case 
of Argentina, cotton exports are secondary to 
sales to the domestic textile industry; ii) even in 
the domestic textile industry, cotton fibre has to a 
great extent given way to synthethic fibres; iii) 
consequently, there is a structural crisis in the 
sector, as a result of which the area sown with 
cotton is now no more than 40% of what it was 
during the 1950s; iv) moreover, Mexico is suffer-
ing a conjuctural profitability crisis which, 
however, may have been partly solved with the 
recent devaluations; v) because of the impor-
tance of cotton in the areas where it is grown, it 
nevertheless has a definite future in Mexico, and 
the Federal Government will undoubtedly make 
every effort to protect it. 
4. Guatemala 
With a production of 618 000 bales in 1979/ 
1980, Guatemala ranks first among the Central 
American cotton producing countries. 
Cotton was introduced into the country 
rather late, but it is now firmly established; it 
accounts for 13% of exports and generates 20% 
of all employment (table 11 shows the evolution 
of basic cotton indicators in Guatemala). 
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Table 11 
GUATEMALA: AREA SOWN, PRODUCTION, DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION AND 





















































































Source: Central Bank of Guatemala and International Cotton Advisory Committee. 
Land tenure is very concentrated in Guate-
mala; cotton holdings average 638 ha and 50% of 
this land is in the hands of 40 owners. 
Furthermore, yields per hectare are very 
high in Guatemala, coming second only to Israel. 
However, a closer look at this phenomenon con-
siderably dampens any optimism one might feel 
from looking at this single indicator, for it has 
been clearly shown that there is excessive ap-
plication of insecticides (up to 40 applications, 
as compared with 0 to 5 in the rest of Latin A-
merica) and this, together with the use of other 
chemical inputs, causes frequently irreversible 
damage to the environment, affecting food, 
water, the fauna and the flora. In this regard, 
the studies carried out by the Central Amer-
ican Institute for Industrial Research and Tech-
nology (ICAITI)27 are very interesting; in addition 
to criticizing the current situation, they propose 
alternative methods (natural pest control) which 
could minimize damage to the environment. 
From another point of view, i.e., the strictly 
"See ICAITI: An Environmental and Economic Study of lhe 
Consequences of Pesticide Use in Central American Cotton Produc-
tion, Final Report, Guatemala, 1977; and, more recently, 
Ronald Estrada Húrtate (Consultant to ICAITI), El algodón en 
su etapa de desastre, Guatemala, April 1981. 
economic one, many questions have been raised 
as to how rational it is to maintain the current 
level of use of chemical inputs, both for mi-
croeconomic reasons, i.e., high production costs 
(40% of gross value goes to the purchase of these 
inputs), and for macroeconomic reasons, i.e., the 
negative implications of the phenomenon for the 
net foreign exchange balance, since a great majo-
rity of these inputs are imported. 
According to official figures, summarized 
below, for each dollar's worth of cotton exported 
in 1980/1981, there was a foreign-exchange out-
flow (essentially for chemical inputs and fuels) of 
55.6 cents (see table 12). 
Another distinctive feature of cotton pro-
duction in Guatemala is the shortage of domestic 
credit; according to figures released by the Bank 
of Guatemala, such credit only covers 10% of the 
gross value of production. Thus, comparatively 
speaking, financial resources obtained from 
abroad play a more important role (between 20% 
and 40% of the total value of production between 
1976 and 1980) and are used mainly for import-
ing inputs. 
Because of the large average size of cotton 
holdings in the country, marketing and ginning 
operations are usually carried out by the produc-
er, who, when he does not have his own plant, 
hires the services of a ginning contractor. The 
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Table 12 
GUATEMALA: ESTIMATED NET EFFECT OF 
COTTON EXPORTS ON THE BALANCE OF 
PAYMENTS 
1979/1980 1980/1981 
Thousands „ Thousands ~ 
of /0 of /o 
quetzales quetzales 
Gross income from 
exports 202 980 100.0 223 384 100.0 
Foreign exchange 
outflow for inputs 84 124.1 41.4 124 201.5 55.6 
Net effect on the 
balance of payments 118 855.9 58.6 99 182.5 44.4 
Source: Bank of Guatemala, official estimates. 
latter, who is usually linked to the oil industry or 
the export trade, generally receives, as payment 
for the proccesing, the seed obtained from this 
operation. Cottonseed meets 100% of the 
domestic demand for edible oils and its exporta-
tion is strictly prohibited. 
Cotton producers and others involved in the 
cotton business deal with 14 "traders", almost all 
foreigners, who are able to intervene in the mar-
ket because of the marketing lines they have 
abroad. These traders earn profits which are 
reported to be between 4% and 6% of the FOB 
price. 
There are also several taxes,28 which at the 
beginning of 1982 represented 2.5% of the FOB 
export price. 
Guatemalan cotton exports go mainly to the 
Far East, although European countries still 
account for an appreciable percentage of sales, 
i.e., between 25% and 40% in recent years. 
As in the case of most cotton-exporting coun-
tries, Guatemala is faced with serious problems 
relating to the profitability of the crop. This 
situation is aggravated, as has been noted above, 
by the high cost of imported inputs. 
It is estimated that at the beginning of 1982, 
after the relevant deductions were made (1.25 
28A progressive import duty, a municipal tax, a tax for 
the National Cotton Council (a public entity which advises the 
Government on matters pertaining to cotton) and a stamp 
tax. 
cents for taxes, 2.5 cents for traders' profits, 2 
cents for financial costs and around 5.25 cents 
for freight, insurance and other costs), a CIF price 
of 63 cents/pound left the producer-marketer a 
gross income of around 52 cents per pound. 
At 1982 cost levels, which were around 60 
cents per pound,29 the crop would clearly be 
unprofitable. Only a devaluation, or freedom to 
dispose of foreign exchange on the parallel mar-
ket, could solve the immediate problems of the 
cotton sector; even so, the longer-term structural 
problems mentioned above would still remain. 
5. Nicaragua 
After the sharp drop in both area sown and pro-
duction which it had suffered in 1979, when it 
was torn by civil war, Nicaragua was able, in 
1980-1981, to reach a production level of 
345 000 bales and a slightly lower volume of ex-
ports. Even so, the recovery was not complete 
(see table 13). 
The radical political change which took place 
in July 1979 had, of course, profound implica-
tions for the Nicaraguan economy as a whole, 
and the cotton sector was no exception. The full 
implications of these changes cannot yet be mea-
sured, since a debate is still going on in the coun-
try as to what the medium- and long-term char-
acteristics of the sector should be. 
For the time being, however, it should be 
noted that two measures have been taken which 
are of fundamental importance to the cotton sec-
tor: firstly, the nationalization of 15% of the cur-
rent production area (which had belonged to 
persons prominent in the former régime and 
which is now part of the "Area of Public Own-
ership" {Area de Propiedad del Pueblo - APP); and 
secondly the creation of a State enterprise (the 
National Cotton Enterprise, Empresa Nacional de 
Algodón - ENAL) which has a monopoly on the 
domestic and external marketing of cotton. 
Traditionally, the ownership of cotton land 
was in the hands of small and medium-sized 
farmers. In 1979, the average area of a cotton 
holding wa,s 39 hectares, but the strata who 
owned between 70 and 350 hectares accounted 
29Even higher estimates are given in Guatemala, but 
they have been disregarded here because they originate from 
interested circles within the trade. 
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Table 13 
NICARAGUA: AREA SOWN, PRODUCTION, YIELD, DOMESTIC 
CONSUMPTION AND EXPORTS OF COTTON FIBRE, 1960-1982 
y Area sown Production Yield . Exports 
(thousands (thousands (kg/per ^ , (thousands 

































































Source: International Cotton Advisory Committee and Central Bank of Nicaragua. 
a
 Preliminary figures. 
for a large proportion of the land (half the total 
area). The 1979 revolution did not change this 
situation, except for the fact that 15% of the 
cotton land has been turned over to the APP. 
In Nicaragua, as in Guatemala, the increase 
in costs poses a very serious problem. This is 
particularly true with regard to the costs of im-
ported inputs (from 15 to 20 applications of in-
secticides per year in some cases), which have 
reached the disturbing level of 43% of the FOB 
30 price 
As regards marketing, before the Revolution 
the system in Nicaragua was similar to that which 
exists in Paraguay. In other words, there was a 
large number of producers, State intervention 
was minimal, and commercial and financial in-
termediaries obtained large margins of profit. 
Half the production of cotton was marketed 
without ginning, thus obliging producers to go 
through yet another intermediary. Purchasing 
agents of export companies, mostly foreign, 
often operated as an oligopoly, and producers 
had not alternative but to deal with them. 
30These figures were supplied by the Ministry of Plan-
ning, which breaks costs down as follows: 30% for wages, 18% 
for other components and 9% for freight, ginning and 
packing. 
At present, with the nationalization of 
domestic and foreign trade, prices are set in a 
centralized manner, ENAL has also followed a 
policy of encouraging producers to carry out 
ginning operations on their own account, and 
prefers, except in exceptional cases (only 3% 
in 1981/1982) to buy cotton which has already 
been ginned and classified. 
There are 26 ginning plants in the country 
and nine of these are in the hands of the State 
(not of ENAL, however), while the remainder be-
long to the major producers or to the oil in-
dustry. 
Cottonseed had traditionally supplied 100% 
of the country's edible oil. In recent years, 
however, as a result of the drop in cotton produc-
tion, it became necessary to import soya bean oil. 
The plan now is to develop national production 
of soya beans and African palm, thus substantial-
ly diversifyng the sources of oilseeds. 
During the 1981/1982 season, producers re-
ceived a price of 840 córdobas per 100 pounds 
FOB Corinto (the country's port of export); this is 
equivalent to 84 US cents per pound at the offi-
cial exchange rate of 10 córdobas per dollar. 
Discounts are made according to the grade of 
cotton and for domestic freight to the port, but 
there are no export taxes, although there is a 
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possibility that if international prices improve, 
some type of retention mechanism might be in-
troduced for the purpose of building up a stabi-
lization fund. 
According to the Nicaraguan authorities, the 
price of 840 córdobas per 100 pounds represents 
a subsidy, inasmuch as, at the official exchange 
rate, cotton did not even reach a price of 70 US 
cents per pound CIF (i.e., 700 córdobas per 100 
pounds), in 1982. In practice, the same author-
ities are very much aware that the official ex-
change rate does not at all reflect the current 
ratio between domestic and foreign prices. 
Moreover, there is a parallel exchange market 
which is tolerated by the Government and in 
which the price of the dollar is almost triple the 
official rate. 
Given these circumstances, it is not surpris-
ing that producers complain that the current 
price is not profitable. According to estimates 
made in early 1982 by the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade, the 1981/1982 season will bring net losses 
to producers, even with costs at a very favourable 
level. 
It would be too complicated to discuss in 
depth a subject which has political implications 
(the role of cotton growers in the previous and in 
the current régimes, and possible long-standing 
prejudices against cotton growing) which 
obviously go beyond the scope of this study. 
We can only remark, as do some of the major 
sectors participating in the debate on economic 
policy that is currently going on in Nicaragua, 
that unless cotton production is made profitable, 
In this article we have tried to analyse various 
aspects of the international trade in cotton, both 
globally and from the viewpoint of a more thor-
ough analysis of the five major cotton fibre ex-
porters of Latin America. Despite the demand 
and price problems being faced by cotton-
producing countries, there is still no real interna-
tional institutional machinery to protect the pro-
ducer countries. 
it will simply tend to disappear from the country. 
Moreover, if cotton exports disappear or if they 
are greatly reduced, adequate substitutes must 
be found to make up for the negative effect 
which such a development might have on the 
balance of payments and consequently, on 
specific prospects for the economic development 
of the country. 
Finally, reference should be made to the op-
eration of the new export system. It would 
appear, at least as far as the destination of ex-
ports is concerned (a heavy concentration in the 
Asian countries), that the political change of 
1979 has not greatly modified the previous situa-
tion. 
Marketing practices, however, have under-
gone significant changes, as ENAL has encour-
aged the practice of selling directly to users. This 
has ocurred in the cases of the Chinese State 
company "Chinatex" and the textile industry co-
operatives of Taiwan, but this objective has not 
been achieved in the case of Japan, to which ENAL 
still sells its product through trading companies. 
In short, it should be noted that: i) the recent 
political change has had implications for the cot-
ton sector whose extent cannot yet be fully evalu-
ated; ii) the level of production has fallen, 
although it is not very clear whether past levels 
will be recovered or not; iii) there is an immediate 
problem of profitability which is not very differ-
ent from that of other Latin American countries 
and with regard to which the Government must 
take decisions in line with the role it wishes to 
assign to the cotton sector in future. 
As is well known, there are two international 
organizations, namely, the International Cotton 
Advisory Committee (ICAC) and the Internation-
al Institute for Cotton (nc),31 but the scope of 
3lThe ICAC, with headquarters in Washington, is a 
centre which evaluates and centralizes information on 
various aspects of cotton growing and the cotton trade. The 
lie, on the other hand, with headquarters in Brussels, has a 
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their activities is limited to gathering information 
and promoting the use of cotton. Some time ago, 
a proposal was put forth for the creation of a new 
organization, the International Cotton Develop-
ment Association (ICDA), under the auspices of 
the United Nations and the World Bank.32 This 
effort, however, did not bring any appreciable 
results. 
Efforts aimed at the signing of an Interna-
tional Cotton Agreement within the scope of the 
UNCTAD Integrated Programme for Commod-
ities have also been unsuccessful. Six preparatory 
meetings were held between 1977 and 1983,33 
but disagreements among participants (not only 
between consumers and producers, but also 
within the latter group) made it impossible to 
agree on any kind of practical measures. As a 
result of this, some of the producer countries 
decided to set up a Producers' Association, 
known as the Izmir Group. So far, its activities 
have been limited to the discussion of possible 
options for joint action. 
With respect to the future, it is difficult to 
imagine that, if better times should come, this 
can be considered as being the fruit of interna-
tional negotiations, at least as long as the United 
States remains reluctant to participate in any 
price protection mechanism. 
Instead, any positive signs should be attrib-
uted to the attenuation of the recessive phase 
through which the world economy is going; to a 
subsequent improvement in the competitiveness 
limited membership (11) and devotes itself exclusively to 
promoting the use of cotton fibre in Western Europe and 
Japan. 
32See the proposal for the establishment of the ICDA 
prepared jointly by UNDP, the World Bank and the 
Rockefeller Foundation (New York, 1977). 
33See the entire series of documents (over 20) published 
by UNCTAD under the symbol TD/ii/iPc/Cotton. 
of cotton with respect to synthetic fibres; to the 
possible success of programmes for promoting 
the use of cotton at the world level and, as far as 
textiles and made-up articles are concerned, to 
the disappearance or substantial reduction of 
protectionist measures applied by importing 
countries. 
Because of the lack of specialized interna-
tional structures, the cotton-exporting develop-
ing countries must still cope, as in the past, with a 
situation which is fraught with difficulties. In 
many cases this had led to extreme situations 
where many have doubts about the future 
viability of cotton fibre as an export commodity 
capable of making a significant contribution to 
the external financing of the countries con-
cerned. 
In conclusion, the following approaches 
were perceived in the different countries of 
Latin America: 
i) to move out of the fibre market and direct 
the export potential of the country towards 
the production of yarn and made-up articles 
(Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Colombia); 
ii) to continue in the fibre market, but exercise 
pressure at the government level for the 
establishment of some international regula-
tory mechanism (Mexico and, to a lesser ex-
tent, Argentina); 
iii) to maintain the historical approach in the 
hope that an improvement in prices might 
make it possible to recover a satisfactory level 
of profitability for the crop (Guatemala and 
Paraguay). 
It would seem that some type of subregional 
consultation mechanism where these different 
positions could be discussed would be helpful in 
the search for a solution to the problems which, 
as we have tried to point out, are to some extent 
shared by all the cotton-growing countries of 
Latin America. 
